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Abstract: In his article, “The Extinction Race: Techniques of the Human in Proust, via Houellebecq”
James Dutton “reads” identity and race from the point of view of technics. Namely, he does so through
the work of two nominally “Eurocentric” authors, Marcel Proust and Michel Houellebecq, observing how
familial and racial resemblance is a living inscription of “lost time.” This inscription comes about through
the technical means available to and constitutive of the categories which bind them. Thus, instead of
furthering unfinishable racial distinctions which only serve to support discourses of racism, this article
follows assertions made in the novels of Proust and Houellebecq which read atavism as narrative—that
is, all that could be reconstructed from the marks of any, or all, human history. In doing so, these texts
emphasize how inscription—which comprises and “gives” all of culture, identity, and race—is bound to
the interpretive futurity of reading, collapsing all sense of racial survival and extinction into the writing
of remains.
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James Dutton
The Extinction Race: Techniques of the Human in Proust, via Houellebecq
In this article, I want to “read” the technical makeup of identity and race. In doing so, I hope to view
human subjectivity through a long lens (as long as I can imagine), by interpreting what the “human
race” might mean without the human—that is, from the point of view of its remains. In doing so, I want
to avoid the trap of post-human logic that, as Tom Cohen rightly acknowledges, “tends to re-secure a
‘humanism’ that was never there to begin with”—an absence typified by the “humanizing,” raciallyjustified violence of colonialism (“Introduction” 20). My focus will therefore be upon interpreting beliefs
on the subject of race through the relationship between inscription and extinction, especially in light of
immediate questions regarding the human and its legacies in the so-called Anthropocene era.1 What
effect does the Anthropocene have on race, racism, and identity? What meaning do the racial
exceptionalisms that feed into racist and racializing discourses have in the shadow of extinction? As Paul
Gilroy notes, fixed conceptions of racialized identity emerged as “a critical element in the distinctive
vocabulary used to voice the geopolitical dilemmas of the late modern age,” where identity is no longer
viewed as “an ongoing process of self-making and social interaction” but “instead a thing to be possessed
and displayed,” a warrant for exclusionary difference (Between 103). As immanent, corporeal reality
always refuses or elides these stark, static beliefs, one can note the futility and short-sightedness of
identity-based racism. Notably, the inhuman future portended by the Anthropocene hypothesis brings
such futility into radical focus. In this respect, I want to argue that late-modern humanity’s obsession
with narratives of identity and exclusion underwrite its extinctive course: racism and extinction are
equivalent, both clinging to vain exceptionalisms that serve only to underwrite their remains.
Numerous scholars have argued that the conception and development of narratives pertaining
to identity and race are bound up in modernity’s exclusionary logics of nationalism, parochialism, and
racist distinction.2 Indeed, Ellen Feder’s convincing argument that “the deployment of race is primarily
a function of . . . ‘biopower’” (5), insofar as it is mobilized through biopolitical institutions like the nationstate, social collectives, schools, prisons, hospitals and in particular the family, demonstrates disciplinary
power’s role in reifying racial narratives and identities. Such biopower operates in a “prosthetic” or
technical manner, where institutions entrench belief in identity: I am produced in, and as, my immediate
racialized milieu (my parents, siblings, colleagues, coevals). This sense of social and political distinction
encourages cuts between or against cultivated identities, and how these cuts take place makes up the
technical basis, or technics, of race. “If the border is the oldest site of racial antagonism,” Grant Farred
asks, then it is in all forms of “bordering” (geopolitical, social, metaphysical, and corporeal) “that the
complications of the past demand the most assiduous engagement, not at the bureaucratic centre where
resolutions, both real and symbolic, are more easily available” (17). Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic famously
set a marker for postcolonial discourse as anti-nationalist and resistant to “essentialist” critiques based
on identifiably homologous conceptions of identity. Instead, Gilroy emphasizes how diaspora forges
connectedness via a “logic of unity and differentiation” (Black 120), a continuous process that is always
enmeshed within other political logics. In this vein, postcolonial theory has worked to critique race on
the basis of always unfinished processes, like Frantz Fanon’s idea of “epidermalization” (11), where
colonial cultures reduce “others” to presumptions about their skin, neglecting the complex web of
identifications this disseminates in every act of interpellation. 3 Fanon’s insights show how
The extinctive force of “human,” technical endeavour consists of almost innumerable relations. Not only has
technological development led to unprecedented destruction of animal habitats and biospheres, but we only
become aware of these extinctions because of technological development, as Joshua Schuster points out. “We
know more than ever now about the history of life and death on the planet,” he writes, “but we are still witnessing
a dramatic loss of species, largely due to human causes that include expansive pesticide use, habitat destruction
and over-hunting and fishing. We are becoming terribly knowledgeable about the disappearance of life as it
disappears. We are making a science and a culture out of coming to terms with extinction” (97).
2
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer sum up this situation aptly: “Race is not, as the racial nationalists claim, an
immediate, natural peculiarity . . . Race today is the self-assertion of the bourgeois individual, integrated into the
barbaric collective” (138). On this point, see also Susan Lape’s Race and Citizen Identity in the Classical Athenian
Democracy, which provides a useful account of the particularities of this interrelation (and its genealogies),
identifying the often nebulous package of beliefs and self-identifications that made up Athenian “racial identity”—
one of the first of its “political” kind. Aileen Moreton-Robinson charts the indelible link between racialized
categorization and colonialist possession, violence and extraction in The White Possessive.
3
As Kelly Oliver has shown, Fanon’s writings describe how “’white’ and ‘black’ are relative terms that refer more to
social standing than to some natural skin color in itself; there is no skin color in itself . . . Whiteness and blackness
1
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epidermalization seeks to collapse the unknowable potential of identity to apparent physical properties,
but even these are technical beliefs, imposed inconsistently and relative to social and political contexts.
In this essay, I want to employ this approach to underline the extinctive pro-ject latent in propertybased, bordering distinctions of race and identity.
To make this argument, I am going to observe how a particular strand of European literature
inherently resists such forms of distinct categorization by breaking down a self-evident idea of human
life. Because identity is always a social or technical production, any sense of the (predominantly white,
male, occidental) “Enlightenment’s” mythical trope “the” human—one which survives on a history of
barbarous exclusions—is inscribed in an archive, and lives on because of this inscription. Claire
Colebrook saliently outlines this point: “everything that appears as a ‘we’, as ‘techne,’ as engineering,
as Nature, as past and as future is the outcome of inscriptive processes that select and erase, generating
what will survive and be sustained” (“Twilight” 116). And yet, this archive is being rendered increasingly
fragile by the centrepiece of Enlightenment—that is, extractivist capitalism. Archival practice is thus
wedded to an extinctive trajectory, one bound up in the exclusionary intent of colonialisms that seek to
erase any culture’s inevitable multiplicity of voices. In this respect, I want to highlight how a selfcancelling irony in the work of two authors with specifically Eurocentric reputations, Marcel Proust and
Michel Houellebecq, epitomizes the tenuousness of race in the shadow of extinction. This irony nullifies
any kind of racial exceptionalism these authors’ “canonization” may seek to impart: their writing is not
only centred upon the relationship between writing and extinction but predicated by it. Houellebecq
gestures to Proust’s work as being exemplary of European “high modernism,” but he does so, I argue,
in order to highlight this relationship. Proust’s Recherche, a novel focused on what kind of writing may
exceed death, became intermingled with this question to the point that Proust’s own death became the
novel’s only possible conclusion. In turn, much of Houellebecq’s work imagines a “post-” or “neo-”
human future, and utilizes this motif to frame the inscriptive role of literature’s “biodegradability” in
giving (or upsetting) human ideological continuity. After the human, technics (especially textuality)
dissolve into irony: its apparent meanings, identities and genealogies become mere reiterable marks.
In interpreting the human from its inscribed remains—be they actual human remains in the form of
tombs and memorials, our writings and languages which mark these, or our most significant literary
work, the Anthropocene—we can ask what its life might have constituted, but also consider a future in
which reading does away with the all-too-human exceptionalism typified by racism.
Proper Human Life
In setting out his convincing reading of nature as that which de-natures (natura denaturans), Frédéric
Neyrat argues that “the Earth is a wild entity that, over billions of years, has dodged” the “absurd lassos”
of human appropriations. In this regard, the Earth as denaturing nature is a metonymy that can never
be reduced to “something for humanity,” but instead is the becoming that passes through “the” human’s
various, brief, iterations (173). It is this metonymical becoming that destabilizes human properties as a
dispersive, natural process. This “as” is the functional term of metonymy, but also the movement from
which nature escapes human conceptions of form and property through time. Natural metonymy thus
troubles, or rather interlaces, distinctions between self and other, proper and improper, and neutralizes
their attempted immunization and self-closure. As Roberto Esposito outlines, it “could be said that the
entire Western tradition has remained held in this antinomic turn: the strange is conceivable only in
terms of its preventative dissolution,” as the borders put up around the proper (Immunitas 172). Thus,
Esposito’s “immunitary paradigm,” which troubles the inside of ontological distinction—the outside of
identity must always be taken inside in order to forge a distinguishing background of difference—signals
to the inconsistency of any attempt to appropriate nature’s becoming “outside.” Human technical
production, even on the most fundamental level of ontological distinction, is immunized by this
movement of nature. As Neyrat makes abundantly clear,
The Earth is first and foremost a traject, a long-term trajectory originating from out of the depths of time
and destined for extinction. Far from being compact and malleable, the Earth is opaque. Much to the chagrin
of the human being, it does not provide a full and clear image of itself: will humans be capable of inhabiting
an Earth that withdraws from a project of integral constructability? (134)

I would like to follow this reasoning to observe categories of distinction between “natural” human
identities as this kind of constructed, technical production—distinguished outsides that are only ever
are part of an ideology created to justify exploitation which becomes a psychological justification for one’s own
sense of oneself as superior” (183).
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given by an immunitary traject that resists the distinction of ontological bordering. In this regard,
defining individual identity is always a complex metonymical relation between “its” inside and outside:
this contention has received significant critical coverage, which takes up the first conception of the
human person from the Roman Empire onwards. Esposito describes how the Roman juridical mechanism
only attributed the “full sense of the term” person to free, Roman men, initiating a complex tradition of
designating personhood only from out of what it is not (“The Person and Human Life” 208).4 This shows
the historical and political relativity of “personal identity”: but, one could argue, what about the
immanent reality of our own, natural bodily matter? Each “individual” human existence is traceable, as
a kind of narrative, along a line of other embodied human histories (like metonymy). Human subjectivity,
in this regard, emerges as a living archive, the remains of past lives that have occasioned its existence—
and thus, in many respects “are” its existence, but cut off as the formal categories of an embodied
subject. This is especially true for the trope of the body, but even if the proper formality of the bodily
narrative is believed, what is the absolute origin of this form? Dispersed along family or genealogical
timelines, the body itself is an inscription, a text that is endlessly re-translated by the marks of its
remains.5 Belief in its hermetic singularity as the never-changing “site” of selfhood is exactly that—a
belief, a technical production. Giorgio Agamben reads the trope of the absolute sovereign’s body to
emphasize this belief. “The King is dead; long live the King”: this translation of identity must “above all
represent the very excess of the emperor’s sacred life,” but as we read this logic of sovereign identity
as the sense of sovereign life in general—that is, “the” human body—Agamben argues that this
“metaphor of the political body appears no longer as the symbol of the perpetuity of dignitas, but rather
as the absolute and inhuman character of sovereignty” (101).6 Each distinct, sovereign body is given by
the inhuman, archival character of these metaphors.
Peter Sloterdijk’s theory of “negative gynaecology” also contributes to this approach. It seeks to
refigure metaphysical distancing otherwise conceived in the form of objectivity and Vorhandenheit
through the lived-through experience of an “original inner togetherness.” To avoid “bringing false
daylight into the night with reifying terminologies,” negative gynaecology seeks to stick as closely as
possible to the uniqueness of every Dasein, prioritising in its approach the non-objective (or
“nobjective”) experience of sense before it is cut-off into identification and categorisation. All
experiences of sense and being are always-already mediated, invaded and complexified by immune
forms of “otherness” that constitute identity: this a priori intermingling of times and spaces that gives
life and identity is what Sloterdijk describes as “the With,” an originary state of inextricable togetherness
(Bubbles 356). Technics are what give “us” the possibility of life before the latter has, or can, be
differentiated or objectified. Sloterdijk thus advocates for philosophy to turn towards a “general
immunology” of spaces and states, an advanced phenomenology that reads technics and prostheses as
already interwoven with the production, in every infinitesimal conception, of “human life”: every
anthropology is already an anthropotechnics. General immunology would allow for a theorization that
considers life-production as contingent, fragile, but for that reason ongoing, a pro-cess where identity
is not bound to historical or nihilistic forms (like racist distinction) that serve only to reduce the possibility
for life to develop (Change 449–451). Such banally objective states are to be overcome in the
protentional forward movement of anthropotechnic life, where negative gynaecology identifies natal life
and birth as states of such forward-movement, typified by the inevitable With-integration of
immunological “alterity.” Each body that adds to the passage of family identity thus remains With-in it,
while at the same time destroying it (or what “it” was). Every birth keeps the family identity alive in the
very process of rendering it precarious.
In this sense, the “event” of birth is one that cannot, in good faith, be segmented into a single
moment. The popularity of various pro-life movements in some countries is testament to the politically
difficult distinction of “singular” life. 7 Equally, natural, genetic predispositions and resemblances
Esposito’s work is exemplary on this point. See also Categories 151 and Third Person 9.
Gilroy has described how the “appeal to family” in discourses of racial unity and connectedness “should be
understood as both the symptom and the signature of a neo-nationalist outlook that is best understood as a
flexible essentialism” (Black Atlantic 99). Extending the figure of the family in discourses of race and genealogy
collapses the complexity of genealogical identity into simplified, and thus politically malleable, tropes.
6
See also Esposito’s account of this biopolitical paradigm of sovereignty that, historically, meant that the
monarch’s mortality “immunizes him through a separation from himself that makes his natural death the vehicle
for his institutional survival.” This accounts not just for monarchical sovereignty, but inscriptive sovereignty and
life. In this way, “it is through death that sovereignty survives itself” (Immunitas 70).
7
See Gilbert’s article “Symbiosis as the Way of Eukaryotic Life” for a biologically rigorous account of organisms as
“multi-genomic consortia/teams/ecosystems,” rendering “individual” life a co-originating process of symbiosis
(201).
4
5
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challenge the stability of a purely discrete, self-identical subject independent of any With. The immediate
similarities we have to our parents and grandparents are often enhanced later in life as genetic
characteristics emerge. This is a persistent theme in Proust’s Recherche, where atavism emerges
unexpectedly, unpredictably, and always unintentionally, upsetting confidence in bounded subjective
identity and showing the work of time on our technical beliefs. This takes many forms in the novel—
countless characters often accidentally reveal hidden links to past family histories, which allow the
narrator to point out the living (bodily) inscriptions of once lost time8—but perhaps the most interesting
example is when its narrator describes how his mother gradually becomes her own mother following the
latter’s death. He describes the uncanny presence of her “transformation”: “it was no longer my mother
I saw in front of me, but my grandmother” (Sodom 170–171). He likens the effect of this immanent
atavism to the accession of titles in royal families or the nobility, in which the son comes to literally sign
as, to take on the name of his father. In this example, one can note the living work of irony in writing—
we know that the son is not the father, but rather a different version of the same. As Mark Turner points
out, “kinship relations give . . . our closest metaphors for metaphor itself,” producing a kind of “living
anaphora: from parents to child we see repetition and variation, similarity and difference” (193). A
similar version of the same inscribes its confluences in the living being, and in such a way allows the
title to “live on,” to go on being signed as itself.9
I want to assess the technicity of this “living anaphora” to draw attention to how this irony (or
immunitary paradigm), a “similar difference” that we mark as identity, unconsciously sets out
determining characteristics that are only ever contextually dependent. That is, the son’s identity derives
from his similarity to the father in all situations other than in comparison to the father, in which his
identity derives from his difference from the father. This is most readily identified in the way Proust
describes the strange paradox of familial succession, which continues while altering the precise “idea”
of family resemblance or identity. For example, the fabled Guermantes family, perhaps the most
prominent in the novel, possesses a profoundly immunological quality. “As an overdetermined elite,”
Joseph Litvak writes, “minoritized and majoritized at once, the Guermantes represent” the allure of a
seemingly appropriable alterity that can never be categorized, namely because of “their status as quasimythological divinities, as alluring racial others” (84). The narrator is at pains to emphasize how this
status emerges from the technical development (the mythology, the romance and history) of the very
name “Guermantes.”10 Their family identity is a mysterious, enticing narrative, one that constantly
inverts itself through its epochal inscription and utterance, insofar as it is never “read” the same way.
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick describes the importance this has for Proustian identity and its living inscription
of lost time:
Family resemblance—any resemblance, in fact, including those between people and animals or objects— is a
ground for invoking some version of transmigration. And while Proust describes different beings as
incarnations of the same soul, he also envisions an individual’s lifetime as a narrative encompassing many
deaths and many unrecognizable rebirths. (Weather 7)

“Family resemblance” in this sense is the immanent retention of a kind of disappearance, where we can
readily discern how time preserves what we might deem “identity” precisely by altering, or even
destroying it.
Importantly, this kind of similar difference is analogous to the “writing” of the genome and of the
progression of life more generally. The inscriptive, technical nature of reproduction should not be
overlooked in any discussion of identity. Erin Obodiac points out that “likening the sequencing of DNA
8

The narrator identifies atavistic similarities between family members “with the satisfaction of a zoologist” (Finding
250), but he is equally careful to note that, being technical constructs, the signs of identity (be it personal or
familial, if such a distinction is possible) either increasing or fading with age always “remained dependent on the
spectator . . . like the presence of infusoria in a drop of water,” they are “brought about less by the progress of the
years than by the place on the scale occupied by the vision of the observer” (Finding 252).
9
Such “similar difference” is fundamental to Gilles Deleuze’s influential reading of the Recherche, where identity is
always made up of relations of difference that are constantly being internalized and transcended “in the direction of
a more profound difference” (60).
10
The narrator details this once the name loses these qualities at the end of the novel: “This little world, in whose
specific nature, defined by certain affinities which attracted to it all the great princely names of Europe and its
power to keep its non-aristocratic elements at a distance, in which I thought I had found a tangible refuge for the
Guermantes name, one which in the end gave it its reality, this little world, in its inner composition which I had
believed was stable, had undergone profound alteration . . . A certain concatenation of aristocratic prejudices and
snobberies, which had once kept at a distance anything that was not in harmony with the Guermantes name, had
ceased to function” (Finding 265).
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to a language has become a commonplace of bioinformatics and genomic discourses,” and that in
“[e]mploying the rhetoric of language itself . . . this biosemiotic paradigm suggests that life is regulated
by ‘linguistic’ principles and that DNA can be understood as a bioarchive or a mnemotechnics of
inscription” (“Grammatechnics and the Genome”).11 Proust’s mirroring of family passage against the
death and rebirths within the same self illustrates how writing and genetic inscription (like the textuality
of DNA “sequences”) function. Antoine Compagnon points out how it is through attention to such
material manifestations of lost time that Proust directs us to what “life is made up of: letters and sounds,
something that is in fact already writing, with the deeply rooted reflex of thought that makes writing
ricochet into the novel” (114). Lost time is inscribed; it remains in bodies and DNA sequences,
overwritten by their genetic code or family resemblances, just like novels whose writing “ricochets” in
and out of them as thought. In his mother’s transformative grief, Proust’s narrator notes the change
that genetic code has already inscribed within it—challenging the singularity of the proper subject
amongst the irony of its lineage. Indeed, each genealogy has a particular singularity from which
difference can be inscribed. But as is the case with all taxonomical distinction or desires to appropriate
difference, the latter is the constituting force, the immunitary paradigm of distinction. Even the human,
and the types of life that it categorizes, are derived from what each category is not. If the
“Anthropocene” era of theory offers us anything, it may be to reconsider how life is produced by the
immunology of technical production, even on the most basic ontological level. Colebrook asks:
If life is understood as that which extends itself through artifice, then we are left privileging a (predominantly)
European mode of life that furthers and expands itself by co-opting and harnessing artifice for the sake of
extension and self-maintenance. One becomes always other than oneself, always through an ever-renewable
technology. This is the self of social life, where to be is to be an ever-flourishing individual for whom making
is always self-making. It is worth noting how such a conception must rely upon and elide race. (“All Life” 11)

The immunitary sense of identity, heredity and race are given and withdrawn by artificial extension—
the belief of differences, which are always technically produced.
Family Resemblance, Through Life and Death
Proust’s narrator identifies this in the embodied expression of his mother’s grief, which serves only to
“break open the chrysalid a little sooner, to hasten the metamorphosis and the appearance of a being
that we bear within us and which, but for this crisis, which misses out on the intermediate stages and
covers long periods in a single bound, would only have supervened more slowly” (Sodom 171). The
metamorphosis of the body is readily accepted, but belief in this logic should then, as the narrator is
outlining here, be extended beyond the parameters of vulgar conceptions of time, even and especially
when making sense of hereditary narratives. His, and indeed his mother’s, perception of the latter is
guided by a larger collective narrative that describes their entire family; one would find it difficult,
outside of standard causal logic, to determine to whom these “familial traits” in fact belong. Do I “have”
my mother’s smile, or her mother’s? Or her mother’s mother’s? The body, and indeed the entire belief
in individuality, is this kind of temporary chrysalid. Instead, immunitary “being” deploys a deeper,
natural time that we each “bear within us,” one which comes to overwrite any thought of our own, or
our distinct, existence. It is this overwriting that “in the end produces on our own features similarities
that were already latent in us, and that above all arrests our more particularly individual activities”
(Sodom 171).
If we extrapolate this artificial trope of the chrysalid,12 we can notice the immunitary extinction
of any singular subject that is borne “within us,” or more stridently, an extinction we bear as the very
constitution of our individuality. If our idea of the individual always comes to be overwritten by a
constituting outside that was inside all along, the relative effect of each overwriting extinction is merely
a question of scale. The human itself, believed in the present as a racial, atavistic or species narrative
tout court, is one that comes about because the human must necessarily become, like the narrator’s
mother, its own mother (nature). The very primacy of narrative-giving “facts” is predicated by ethnic
belief—and, as it takes the form of this kind of “self”-cancelling evolutionary development, it is a belief
on credit. The factual reality of ethnic existence is a human-written narrative, a technical production.
See also Vitale.
Which evidently underlines the above point regarding the absolute inability to totalize an embodied self. Like
other bodily “excesses” like hair, skin, teeth and the like, the chrysalid is a constituting excess—the body relies on
it for life, only to discard it—but the chrysalid is absolutely constituting, insofar as the body cannot come about
without it. One might think of the embryonic sac or the umbilical cord in a similar vein, which begs the question:
where do these chrysalises begin and end?
11
12
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As Bernard Stiegler argues, “the kernel of the fact is its technical essence; its flesh is an ethnic
essence”—their symbiosis comes about because the “envelopment of the universal tendency by the
diversity that appropriates it is effected by layers setting up the degrees of the fact” (Technics 52). I
would like, here, to draw attention to the technico-ethnic corporeality—as evidenced by the metonymic
overlapping that Proust’s narrator believes changes his mother into her own mother—of belief and
narrative tropology more generally. Belief, science, narrative, and dominant metaphysical structures
are technical productions, and it is such an immunitary belief, even in the very real atavism of racial
generation and the kernel of motherly, racial or human essence (depending on the scale) that
underwrites anthropological identity.
Stiegler argues that the primary problem for anthropology is to distinguish the “factual origin of
evolution.” His solution is to note the “techno-logical condition of possibility of the fact” in general,
interpreting the concept of a “fact,” which works as “a catalyst, the act of an evolving potentiality”
(Technics 52). I would argue that this catalysing of nature’s metonymy as “facts” generates the immune
sense of natural extinction as natural identification. It is merely the technical belief in identity (or the
technicality of the fact “itself”) that gives the entire process of ethnic or individual sensibility. Thus, the
layers of appropriation that render the fact into flesh, into living belief, are the racial lineage or
development of the “different” or individual properties of the human. The living death of archival
overwriting that exists within these technical facts is given by the possibility of extinction as these “facts”
are given individual being. It is for this reason that, in this context, Proust’s narrator significantly
resolves:
That we can say that death is not without its use, that the dead person continues to exercise an influence on
us. They influence us more even than the living because, the true reality being set free only by the mind,
being the object of a mental process, we truly know only what we are obliged to re-create by thought, what
everyday life keeps hidden from us. (Sodom 171)

The dead, without whom there would be no “individual” human existence, exist only in the present as
belief in a technical fact, given sense and form by the “dead” archive. In a perfectly natural manner, the
dead go on living in the living, not simply in the mind as memory or grief, and neither only in the
technical belief of the fact of their death (which is irreconcilable, for the dead can only be believed to be
dead by the living because the living can never be made to live their death), but as the very flesh, the
belief of the living that can only take its life from the inscriptive, technical essence of the dead.13
This is why death, and the marks that it leaves in life (or the marks that it lives through life, one
might venture to say) is such an important theme in Proust’s work. Because of its insistent revival of
the dead, Proust’s narrator notes that it is difficult, if not impossible, to make sense of the absence that
death apparently avows.14 Proust’s “narrator’s mind is death-dealing when it seeks to improve upon the
ageing process in humans,” Malcolm Bowie suggests (288), where such working-through of what lives
on from death emerges as technics. It is the ease with which death, and deaths, can be imagined or
fixed into reproducible tropes that we can notice the inhuman or technical quality of tropology in general.
This immunology gives the possibility of life precisely because it interweaves, while constituting, the
boundaries that allow us to identify it with ready-to-hand, even unconscious, tropes. Such a “strange
contradiction between survival and nothingness is, in Proust’s account, a burden that minds bear away,"
Bowie affirms (290), precisely because the only way we can understand life and its absence is through
the technics of belief—tropes, language, and narrative. Neither life, nor the death imagined within it,
can never be expelled from thought or belief—this much attending to the technics of both can teach us.
Proust is quick to assert that selfhood is “intimately related to our relationship with the dead”
according to Anna Elsner, because the “dead are always present within the self” (8). This “presence,”
flickering nascently as familial resemblance, takes identifiable form through the technical prostheses of
language and narrative. In this respect, Proust’s attention to it shows us how family resemblance is a
While critical of the “biological Calvanism” post-Darwinian hereditary theory can arrive at, Esposito focuses on
the theory’s dangerous development and misappropriation across Western Europe at the beginning of the twentieth
century. The determinist bent it employs is Esposito’s chief historical concern, but it is interesting to note his
citation of French paediatrician Eugène Alpert, author of a treatise on this subject entitled L’hérédité morbide
(1919). “The living act,” argues Alpert, “but the dead speak in them and make them what they are. Our ancestors
live in us” (Alpert, cited in Esposito, Bíos 120). Overweighing this interpretation has significant biopolitical
consequences, Esposito argues—but from the perspective of inscription and the immateriality of the human, the
immanence of atavism is worth noting, especially as its belief is written, and in that sense, directed toward an
imagined future that relies on some kind of a contiguity of “similar” life to have any meaning.
14
See Dutton.
13
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strange, technically identified, living-on of death—as marks, or inscriptions, in bodies. And it can emerge
from these inscriptions in unexpected, ironical ways. Sedgwick argues that famous scenes such as the
revelatory final party in Le Temps retrouvé, where the narrator first perceives the marks of his
acquaintances’ aging as some kind of grotesque joke, upturn the belief we have in a “dogged, defensive
narrative stiffness of a paranoid temporality” that “takes its shape from a generational narrative that’s
characterized by a distinctly Oedipal regularity and repetitiveness.” Proust’s interest and insight, for
Sedgwick, is that “generational relations don’t always proceed in this lockstep” (“Paranoid” 26)—that
the very embodied impression of aging is unpredictable. The generational narratives we craft to believe
in racial or heritable truths are exactly that, narrative—a technical prostheses that makes belief
possible—and can be easily upturned by another. As Anne Simon notes, “Proust’s writing promotes an
overlap between the internal and the external: the outside world is implied in the body and effaces its
opacity like the sun shining on horizons indefectibly interior and exterior” (159–160). The body takes
on the outside world’s passing time in an immunological conjuncture: one can never be extricated from
the other, but shines through precisely when we think we can tie down their separation in technical
forms. In this sense, technical extinction, the apparently total absence of this shining-through of life
from the marks that bring it, is the epitome of Proustian Temps perdu. And importantly, his novel’s
interest in the irrepressible emergence of “identity,” especially where and in ways it shouldn’t, suggests
something more complicated, or technical, about time regained.
Proust’s interest in heredity15 and nobility can be read as a result of this attention to the factual
essence of technē as life, in all of its metonymic forms. The body does not represent the individual, nor
does it appropriate the family: the technical production (the belief, the fact, the narrative) that is given
by deaths through the family renders any proper imagination of form feebly inferior, indeed
inappropriate, to supplement or represent the “family” itself. The often defiant, or arrestingly contingent,
immanence of atavism is a familiar trope in the Recherche, often employed to demonstrate the natural
metonymy of identity as change, not form. A typical “chrysalid” Proust uses to demonstrate this
dispersive materiality is the inflections of voice that overlap across different histories, of which the
Recherche produces many examples.16 Notably, in La Prisonnière the narrator is struck by the singularity
of his friend Andrée’s voice, which causes him to reflect upon all of the voices he has known. “I found
them all different, each moulded to a language peculiar to its owner” (89); peculiar, that is, evoking a
specific narrative belief in identity that is necessarily ephemeral. And yet, this peculiarity is scalar. When
describing the voice of the writer Bergotte, he notes how the “idiosyncrasies of elocution which could be
faintly detected in the speech of Bergotte were not peculiar to him”—rather, they were shared by his
brothers and sisters. The narrator suggests that, however “personal they may be, all these human
sounds are transitory, and do not outlive the beings who emit them. But that was not the case for the
Bergotte family” (Shadow 129). Their identity disperses across the common technicity of these
inflections, just as individuality is communed across language and inscription. The technical essence of
voice—but also of style, and therein, the dispersive nature of narrative belief—exceeds its definitive
form and is shared by these “individuals” of that same essence. It is similar difference, or a different
similarity, inscribed in a literary style that can draw our attention to this prosthetic narrative that makes
such a belief identifiable, and thus believable. The Bergottes’ belief in “who” they are bleeds across
different narratives and transmits these “faintly” detectable “idiosyncrasies” (both to the reader, and
amongst themselves) as sensible, but without concrete property.
What is most interesting about using voice to demonstrate this common ancestral currency is that
it takes form “in” the separate family members that enunciate it. The essential ephemerality of voice
(phonē) lends to it a novel immateriality 17 that underscores the “deep-temporal” materiality of the
subject that speaks it.18 The voice, its intention and meaning are subsumed under the technically formed
For more on this subject, see Pauline Moret-Jankus’ illustrative Race et imaginaire biologique chez Proust, as well
as the chapter “Heredity, Homosexuality and Science” in Thody 68–84.
16
The Recherche depicts the unique voices of numerous characters, such as Charlus, Legrandin, Françoise, as well
as the narrator’s mother and grandmother, and often make them a focus of the narrator’s reflections on identity.
For instance, he notes that the mere passing sound of the Duchesse de Guermantes’ voice evokes for him “much of
the natural world around Combray” (Guermantes 493), or that little more than the tone of Charlus’ voice can
reveal his sexual disposition and histories (Sodom 362). On this last point, see Antoine Compagnon’s reading of
what he calls the “Hermant’s son” trope, a man “who betrays himself by an inflection of his voice” (116–117).
17
See Patrick Ffrench’s reading of the scene in the Recherche in which the narrator takes a telephone call from his
grandmother. Ffrench argues that voice “is always in a sense the index of the absence of the other, but of an
absence either really or potentially inflected by loss” (61).
18
This is, of course, a central component of Jacques Derrida’s early philosophy: he argues that the “living imprint”
relative to articulation is “irreducible,” a “passivity [that] is also the relationship to a past, an always-already-there
15
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“peculiarity” of the inflection or style, just as “subjectivity” takes its bodily existence from technical
belief in the “fact” of a historical narrative that comes to overwrite it in the long term. The flesh of each
of these subjects is transient, but its momentary appearance suggests the possibility of appropriation.
It is not only the flesh of voice and subject that are imaginatively appropriated in these brief
temporalizations, but also the narrative of ethnic unity that each signify. As Stiegler specifies, “[e]thnic
unity is essentially momentary and in perpetual becoming; it is never acquired, since it does not itself
proceed from an origin that would be shared by the people comprising the ethnic group: ethnic unity is
conventional, without any other origin than a mythical one” (Technics 54). Ethnic unity, such as that
spread across the voices of the Bergotte family, is fundamentally technical—it is a historical, human
production. But, very importantly, it is at the same time the natural metonymy of life’s immunology. It
overlaps, like a mother’s smile, and makes any precise origin impossible to determine. In noting this
overlapping process of technical production, Proust perceptively directs attention to the becoming of all
imagined unities and essences outside of nature. Nature only gives being in immune materiality—the
prospect of matter comes only in concert with its immaterial other as its unified essence. The improper
outside of the human is produced even from “its” technical, and ethnic, productions.19
Stories of Identity, Technics of Life
One of the most interesting reading of Proust’s treatment of ethnic unity occurs in a fictional work,
Michel Houellebecq’s famed early novel Les Particules Élémentaires. This “fictional” context is particularly
noteworthy because it takes advantage of the power (or impotence) literary inscription has to elude
absolute intention and meaning—writing certifies nothing definitive about its author’s beliefs. The scene
in question here has Houellbecq’s narrator, a sometime lycée French teacher named Bruno, reflecting
on a passage from Proust’s Le côté de Guermantes given to his students to analyse, right after he has
narrated an especially paranoid, racist assessment of his black students. Houellebecq/Bruno directly
cites Proust’s passage, which refers to Mme de Marsantes, a character from the Guermantes family, the
highest echelon of nobility in the Recherche. The extract Houellebecq cites thus refers to the “purity of
[her] blood-line” (Atomised 231). According to Bruno, in his assessment of his students and France
more generally, this side of Proust’s novel “no longer bears any relationship to the world as we know
it,” presumably because “Proust was fundamentally European – he and Thomas Mann were the last
Europeans” (Atomised 232). Such a hermetically “pure” Europe no longer exists in Bruno’s eyes. Never
mind the inhuman colonializing massacres that are quintessentially European, and the effects on cultural
unity of globalization it brought about. The European footprint inevitably brings with it the immigration
and mixing of races that Bruno here identifies as so tellingly non-“European.” In point of fact, there is
nothing more European than Bruno teaching Proust to a global mixture of French students from different
racial backgrounds because Europe itself sought exploration and exploitation of global peoples, whose
immunizing migration into European culture is the prostheses that allowed the creation of any kind of
“Europe” in the first place. “Europe” itself, and the globe that comes into existence through its
mercantilist project,20 can only be made sense of as various technical (that is human, impure), narrative
beliefs. The “purity” of bloodlines has little to do with the purity of Europe, if ever such a thing can be
imagined, and certainly not without a multicultural “blood-line” that is the progressive heartbeat of
European (one might more accurately say mercantile, or capitalist) identity.
“Mixed blood, no frontiers—you do not know where one nation, one race, ends and another
begins.” For Jacqueline Rose, this sentiment describes a way “into the heart of Proust’s writing” (56).
And if we look more closely at the quote of Proust’s that Houellebecq cites, it becomes clear that such
immunitary logic, where borders constantly intermingle in order to define them, was indeed central to
his thinking. Proust’s narrator notes that that Mme de Marsantes was adored, indeed, for “the purity of
her blood which for several generations had flowed only with what was the greatest in the history of
France.” But also, importantly, this is because the nature of the “purity” or nobility of this very blood
“divested her manner of anything ordinary people call ‘airs and graces’ and endowed her with perfect
that no reactivation of the origin could fully muster and awaken to presence” (Of Grammatology 71). See also
Speech and Phenomena, 15.
19
Which, as Neyrat rightly points out, is the ontological basis of the human or technology as given by nature—not
as “the hegemonic space of unrestrained technologies” like defined and inaccessible heredity, but from nature’s
“ecology of separation”—the immunitary outside in. Nature’s always excessive resilience maintains “as one of its
conditions the possibility of an internal or interior distance, an outside within the inside of the world itself” (127).
20
See Sloterdijk’s anthropotechnic theses that colonial and economic expansion in fact creates the modernized
notion of “the globe” as such, which he develops throughout In the World Interior of Capital and in greater detail in
Spheres II: Globes. This globalizing modernity, and all of the violent distinctions it exported, also is responsible for
the generation of the double consciousness phenomena described in Gilroy’s work.
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simplicity” (Guermantes 248). It is because of the pure and European nature of her blood that one
cannot believe her to have “airs and graces,” that is, acting as though she is “above” any other person.
In elevating her to a state of the highest nobility, her manner dictates that she must, for this very reason
(and this is a key trope in Proust’s depiction of “the nobility”) never appear as though she is more
elevated than anyone else: this becomes anything other than a calculated choice on her part, but rather
the nature which her blood or her race writes for her, without her intelligible knowledge. The reified
“purity” of European identity cannot be shown to exist. “Being a great lady means playing the great
lady” (Guermantes 248), notes the narrator. For the Guermantes, indeed for all of us who believe in
any narrative of identity, no distinction can ever be made between the identity and the performance of
the identity; indeed, we only ever have access to the former through the latter. Mme de Marsantes’
“play” is a narrative performance, a belief that seizes these noblest of Guermantes both from within and
without and dictates “their” character, without any influence from the individual upon whom the play is
performed—or subject-ed. As Stiegler hypothesizes, “since ethnic memory is external to the individual,
it can evolve independently of genetic drift and is thus found to be in a sense temporal” (Technics 155).
Is the “purity” of a bloodline genetic or ethnic? Surely the former, but it can only be enacted in temporal
categories, and it is for this reason that the living quality of the race is external, or what Stiegler would
determine as both the technical and the temporized, the trope of living belief. Mme de Marsantes playing
the great lady is a technical production, because this is the only way her ethnic memory can be brought
to life—in the mask-like, de-subjectivizing externality of techno-temporal social life. It cannot be lived
as the death of archival memory, because the singularity of such an event cannot appropriate the entire
multitude of divergent events that make up “the” archive we perceive, one increasingly imperiled by our
belief we can master it (the Anthropocene).
Therefore, what are the properties of Europe, of its races and “pure” bloodlines, other than
subjections and performances, temporalities incessantly reenacted, great ladies playing great ladies?
Bruno asks what any of Proust’s text would mean to his students, or even to himself. “I was beginning
to wonder whether I understood what Proust meant exactly,” he writes. “Here were a dozen pages about
the purity of the bloodline, the nobility of genius in the context of the nobility of race, the rarefied
atmosphere of great doctors… it all seemed bullshit to me” (Atomised 231). But what Bruno overlooks
here (and one can read this as typical of Houellebecq’s familiar irony) is that Proust, too, noticed that
this entire topic is “bullshit”—if we understand bullshit to “mean” irony itself, the immunological With of
identity. Proust, famous for preferring the conversation of maids and footmen to Dukes and Marquises,
draws attention throughout his novel to the ironies and inconsistencies of the “airs and graces” of the
latter and points out that the most noble characters are possessed more by their breeding and
“bloodline” than even they are aware. Even if these “subjects” are like Mme de Marsantes—“always
trying to make clear the various degrees of kinship involved” in relation to her interlocutors, “alluding
incessantly to all the families of Europe under allegiance to the Holy Roman Empire” (Guermantes 248)—
the elevated “spirit” of their name or family forces them to play at their name, humiliating themselves
to the plainest simplicity. The trope of the(ir) family is mobilized in order to believe in it; its narrative
reproducibility affords an active kind of irony that always eludes a fixed “truth” in any one moment.
Proust purposely depicts even the Duc de Guermantes, who has nowhere to go but down from the
summit of nobility he resides at, as more vulgar and insensate than his footmen, whose belief in his
nobility renders his every behavior—even those more vulgar than they could imagine—sacrosanct. The
nobility is immune to vulgarity because, as the fiction of their familial “title” assumes such social
importance, they define, or enact, what is noble. Their subject or person, then, is irrelevant. The iterable
title is merely transposed onto a different custodian, whose subject-defining failures21 can never be so
(the nobility being immune to anything vulgar), and thus never defined. Extinction, too, enacts this
translational immunity, removing the embodied subject and leaving only their inscriptions (titles,
writings, remains). The most European character in this conversation then becomes the black students
made “subject” of Bruno’s racist tirade, who represent the apex of progressive Enlightenment immunity.
Their very embodied presence in, as Europe makes possible the immunological purity of Europe’s
“proper” bloodline. The racist exceptionalism underwriting colonialism collapses into itself, arrogating
an extinctive future in which only the possibility of a different future remains.
One might argue that the very narrative motivation for Particules itself is based on such an
uncertainty as to the “purity” of identity, singularity, and ethnic unity—housed or dramatized within the
most intimate or “self”-similar familial site. Like the Recherche, it is something of a ficto-autobiography,
but Houellebecq differs from Proust by splitting “his” biography across the story of twin brothers—the
On failure as individuation, see Esposito (Categories 152, and Third Person 102), as well as Stiegler (States 33,
62).
21

James Dutton, "The Extinction Race: Techniques of the Human in Proust, via Houellebecq"
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 24.2 (2022): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol24/iss2/7>

page 11 of 15

aforementioned Bruno, and his “genius” brother Michel Djerzinski, a molecular biologist sensitive to the
problematic nature of technics, and whose radical work proves instrumental in developing a future
neohuman race. As if to underscore, or draw ironic attention to, this split of his own life’s story across
two markedly different characters, Houellebecq has Michel reflect on the “purity” of his brother’s
identity: “Was it possible to think of Bruno as an individual? The decay of his organs was particular to
him, and he would suffer his decline and death as an individual. On the other hand, his hedonistic world
view and the forces that shaped his consciousness and his desire were common to an entire generation”
(Atomised 212).
This tension between individual and social identity is typical of Houellebecq’s position on the technical
basis of “human” life, emphasized by this focus on constructivist individuality in Particules. Indeed, the
end of the novel slowly reveals that its text was occasioned as an account of Michel’s life and research,
narrated and ostensibly “written” by a race that has, thanks to this research, superseded human life.
Particules thus asks, or rather inscribes: would being overcome by a technical race differing, but
emerging from humans, make “the human race” extinct? Houellebecq’s decision to refer to his
posthuman race as “neohumans” (an idea he develops in considerably more detail in a later novel,
2005’s La Possibilité d’une île) underlines this contingency, inscribing in their name the link to the race
they surpass and leave behind. But equally, it plays with the imaginative or tropological potential of
such an “extinction”: these neohumans are never “given” to us. As products of the literary imagination,
Houellbecq’s neohuman remains undefined, and the specific qualities that make them neo-humans—
their ethnic unity or identity—emerge in and as imagination of the technical event of narrative. To do
this very imagining is to begin the technical fashioning of such supersession, to open the clearing that
would make our extinction possible or thinkable—a prosthetic trope as active, and technically available,
as life or death.
Hence, all possibilities we have for “making” and thinking life and death are necessarily inscriptions,
technical productions emergent from, but prosthetic to, the natural world. Rose notes some convincing
examples as to how Proust’s conception of race, nation, and identity is grounded in how he “subjects
the frontier to the fluidity of natural life” (56). This fluidity, especially as it pertains to conceiving (types
of) human life, typifies the border where technical identification is derived—or rather, inscribed. Making
the natural world’s opacity into human forms is the technics of life, identity and race that I have been
describing above; importantly, this takes on a narrative form that, in its immunological excess, bleeds
back over into this “natural” fluidity, precisely because of inscription’s outliving “a” human life. Proust’s
narrator takes consistent interest in the technical, narrative productions of ethnic unity in order to note
this inhuman or inscriptive nature of life’s progression. In conversation with the Duchesse de
Guermantes, he notes how, like the Bergottes’, the ethnic unity of the “Guermantes” family is a
descriptive style that possesses the Duchesse’s speech. This leads him to reflect that “[n]oblemen are
almost the only people who can teach you as much as peasants,” because their “conversation is adorned”
with their ways of life (Guermantes 550): like Bruno, the narrative that grafts their ethnic unity is as
much constitutive of their “life” as their body, or their race. And in doing so, Proust’s text sets up a
recursive self-referentiality that breaks apart any sense of united and categorical identity. Its narrator
notes that a “literary mind” would be “enchanted by the conversation” he inscribes here with the
Duchesse, because for him it would form a “living dictionary of all those expressions that are passing
out of the language by the day (Saint-Joseph neckties, children pledged to wear blue, and so on)”
(Guermantes 551). The “literary mind” he arouses here is of course, and self-reflectively, “Proust’s”—
he has chosen to inscribe it here. But, as it is inscribed, and escapes from its author’s control, it is also
the “living” narrative of a history whose ethnic excess cannot be summarised into the simplicity of
naming, as one inscription or direct appropriation. As André Benhaïm outlines in a consummate article
on Proust’s attention to race, “[f]or Proust, the greatest insult, ethically and aesthetically, is to be called
a single name” (64).
This underlines the important gradation that ends the above phrase: “and so on.” This literary
ambiguity, inscribing a potentially infinite portal of interpretation (this “and so on” can never be
completed), signifies why the narrator notes that the pleasure derived from the company of these “living
dictionaries” can be a dangerous one for such literary minds. Importantly, the textual voice we read as
the Recherche (an equally unfinished placeholder for the nebulous, indefinable transit between “Proust”
and “his narrator” that the irony of these sections imposes, and literary inscription creates) here warns
the writer against importing these expressions “raw into his work, which, if he does, becomes still-born
and smacks of staleness” (Guermantes 551). Such a result is inevitable; it is precisely because these
expressions are living—that is, that their interpretation can never be defined or finished, and that they
will always materialise differently as they are read, as an extensive and unpredictable technical
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production—that they possess the narrative excess of improper life.22 It is for this reason that the name
“Saint-Joseph necktie” on its own is stale, technical and unreal, easily passed over as a fad and lost to
history, but coupled with the “and so on” of the Recherche (that leads out and opens back into the
infinity and forgettable excess of its living narrative through its readers’ lives, or in “the natural world”),
it too becomes part of a “living dictionary.” The life that vacillates between this element of the dictionary
within the living dictionary of the Recherche itself (as well as between his ironic and ironizing narrator,
Proust “himself,” and his readers, each in turn undeciding their way through natural and technical
“distinctions”), gestures to the greater inability to distinguish forms of life or technics. Instead, this
living dictionary underwrites the living materiality (that is, a materiality without matter23) of inscription
as narrative, and thus the reflexive movement of a nature given by its unknowable death, or extinction.
The narrative nature of this technical facticity is critical to how Proust’s narrator senses the
entire racial tropology of the Guermantes (and, perceivably, racial tropology in general). After noting
the curious histories of these “expressions” and their signifying excess, he contrasts the effect of his
conversations with the Duchesse to “feelings aroused . . . by the hawthorns or the taste of a madeleine,”
those generally regarded as experiences of memoire involontaire typical to the Recherche. In contrast,
he finds that the “living dictionary” provided by the Duchesse’s “aristocratic conversations” now “left
[him] cold” (Guermantes 551). This is because the Duchesse offers him “stories”—narratives of
excessive facticity, which overwhelm the narrator and his appropriative “belief” in the world. Like a work
of literature or art, the translational effect of the “life” of these stories influences the greater immunity
of his belief in and understanding of the world. They do not have the instantaneous force of an
involuntary memory because, like family resemblance, the narrative living-on of these living dictionaries
are what provide (like the immunological extinction which underwrites) the possibility of involuntary
memory. These inscriptions are the non-living, prosthetic whats that sustain his status as a who—and
for that reason interact with and over-swarm that who-ness, troubling its singularity.24 As he reflects on
these “stories,” he notes that they only temporarily engage his senses, and pass over him, but not
without inscribing within him a disquieting and powerful stimulation. “Entering me for a moment,” he
reflects, “and possessing me only physically, it was as though, being of a social, not an individual,
nature, they were anxious to escape” (Guermantes 551). Possessing him, these narratives are
themselves only possessions—their double-sided ephemerality loops through the subject and disperses
it in the same self-cancelling movement. The experience of the excess of these narratives renders them
inappropriable, and for that reason the narrator feels as though he must carry and disseminate, inscribe
them somewhere else in order to make some appropriable sense of them. Rather than craft into his own
totalizing form, he is written by the narrative, which forces him to retell it in order to craft it into his
own language—even if it makes little or no sense to him. Narrative has a social and ethnic force that
passes through “individuals” caught up in telling it—and yet without it, such individuals could never,
technically, begin to exist.
Conclusion: Technical Extinction and Living-on
Is this not the nature of belief in general? How much do we understand of catastrophic climate change—
and yet, how often do we form opinions about it? How easily read—and repeated—are its tropes? Like
death, the other is principally unknowable, and yet the appropriative gesture of the human is to speak
of it: expressing oneself in general is to territorialize, or make sense of, a singular language whose
depth disappears into “involuntary memory,” yet whose surface we exploit and appropriate as though
every other language falls under the same singularity. It is for this reason that imagining death, and
imagining extinction, are so literally consuming. In saying it we are merely interrupting the narrative or
metonymy we were just saying: extinction or death cannot begin to be written because it is already,
enormously, being written. Beliefs, be they in bodies or ethnicities, are inextricable, metonymical “parts”
of an extinctive archive that cannot be broken apart into properties. This signifies the impossibility of
persisting with the trope of the human race without attending to the excessive sense of its own extinction
as its constituting essence.25 And by interpreting the excessive narratives, or histories, which give these
Boris Groys notes how the only way to define, or “believe in” life in our contemporary biopolitical epoch (where
life can be created or rebuilt) is through verifying narratives (56–57).
23
See Derrida, “Typewriter Ribbon.”
24
See Stiegler’s conception of the “who qua living” (Technics 154).
25
That is, extinctive of property—this archive immunizes any sense of ownership, returning “the human” to a
greater affinity with nature’s improper becoming, similar to the “songlines” Elizabeth Grosz describes. These
songlines exemplify Australian First Nations people’s relationship to the earth, “marked by possession and
stewardship,” not “private property.” This comes about, Grosz argues, “because the earth is already directly
22
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senses of race, and of reasons for the human which can never be known by a single, finite subject in
totality, the beliefs which give the human as a subject can be shown in their futility. As an example of
the impossible individual conception of impending extinction, Robert Markley rightly points out that the
variant “time scales of climate change cannot be experienced viscerally but only imagined.” For this
reason, it is only ever the “measure of several generations—of one or two extended lifetimes—[that]
becomes the timescale of sustainability” or action (57–58), as opposed to the full epiphylogenetic
development that gives “the human” who reads such change. The trace of belief, ironically as inscription,
I would suggest, offers the only (always excessive) other in this context.
The incompatibility of these timescales, one present in his analysis of Proust’s European “bloodlines,”
is what makes race a constant theme for Houellebecq. It is a favoured subject of his for many reasons,
but importantly, I would argue, it is because of his interest in transhumanism. In Platforme, right after
his narrator, Michel, sketches out a theory that all “humanity instinctively tends towards miscegenation,
a generalised undifferentiated state,” and describes how, for this reason, Michael Jackson should be
considered the first, and greatest, “star . . . in the history of the world” (235), His radical and singular
celebrity results from the fact that “he’s neither black nor white any more, neither young nor old and,
in a sense, neither man nor woman . . . having grasped the categories of everyday humanity, he has
done his utmost to go beyond them” (Platform 234). 26 Like every sense of the human, Jackson’s
(non)humanity can only be described—narrated, tropologized, believed—as singular. It is “his,” and his
only. Transcending the basic “categories” of human being is how Jackson, in his very transcendental
and bodily improperty, signifies the beyond of the human, and equally its extinction. But in shattering
these everyday categories in favour of a more radical being that is perhaps technically human, Jackson’s
celebrity underwrites the imperviousness or resilience of life beyond, or without regard for, proper
categories of the human. Of course, this sentiment is also fundamental to Proust’s belief (echoed
consistently across his novel) that identity, indeed individual deaths, are carried along with us in myriad,
often conflicting forms—but it is precisely these technico-hybrid remains that make any form of
personality possible. As he writes in the last few pages of the Recherche: “I understood that dying was
not something new but quite the reverse, that since my childhood I had already died a number of times”
(Finding 347). Such awareness is indicative of the distinctly mundane process of dying, which is the
constant, immunological ground from which life can continue to go on. Proust’s interest in the active
“remains” of family resemblance—as ephemeral, yet coming to life unpredictably, from where one could
only think they were gone forever—is mirrored in Houellebecq’s attention to the purity of “human”
bloodlines, which themselves resurface or unwind only through the technics we have to measure them.
The miscegenation Houellebecq refers to is one that cannot be contained into properly individual,
racial, or human categories. Bruno’s reading of the “extinction” of European “nobility” is testament to
this. The narrative of any “extinction” can never be fully appropriated; it is excessive, and as such
traces, be they genetic or inscriptive, continue to live, grow, and challenge exactly that apparently
certain reading of an extinction that in fact never occurred. The proper and bodily categories imposed
by human technical knowledge are transcended by the transversal force of life in itself. As Colebrook
argues, we only ever imagine the human race as readable, “signaling that there was a species event.”
But this readability is always-already an outside on an extinctive trajectory: “although it emerges from
the proximity of humans, coming into being in order to inscribe, convey and sustain technologies, [it]
comes to the fore only if we imagine being read by something other than human” (“Sex” 47). Even as
the human race in its entirety becomes extinct, of which Michael Jackson, Saint-Joseph neckties, or
fictional narratives provide unknowable or inappropriable examples, the inability to formalize or finalize
it renders extinction necessarily given by, and as the immunitary, technical definition of life itself. Cary
Wolfe suggests that our increasing need to acknowledge extinction links all forms of life in mutual
finitude—this is “not simply a matter of our shared finitude as mortal beings who live and die, [but]
more radically, the finitude of our finitude, its non-appropriability” (68). The shared sense of complete
environmental extinction disqualifies the distinction of an extinction “proper” to any species. Life cannot
be made extinct by the human, only the technical belief in the human can—and the examples, the myths
already given to the human, demonstrate that this extinction applies only to its taxonomies, its technē,

inscribed contrapuntally in the body” generating territorializing “songlines . . . that cut through and inscribe both
the earth and the bodies that abide there” (40). The inscriptive relation between earth and body in these cultures
radicalizes an Occidental sense of “writing,” but signifies inscription’s naturalizing “archive.”
26
Sylvia Martin suggests that Jackson’s identity was in fact always more complicated that these definitive
categories. Jackson’s celebrity relied on a fusion of cultural iconographies in his music, and his racial identity,
deriving “from the African diaspora’s forced migration . . . thus was always already transnational” (284–85).
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and its arts—while at the same time being the very groundless ground of their possibility. Such a destiny
is difficult to believe in, but it is the only one that, and always has, remains.
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